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"LE HORS DE TEXTE, C'EST MOI"
The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction
PierreSchlag*
II n'y a pas de hors de texte.
Jacques Derrida'
L'tat c'est moi.
Louis XIV2
What are the politics of deconstruction? What political implications does deconstruction yield for law? Does deconstruction have
any politics?
To deconstructionists, these are familiar questions. Their frequency is second only to the primordial question: "What is deconstruction?" I have heard this last question many times. Legal
thinkers want to know: What is deconstruction? Of course, legal
thinkers already have at least some vague ideas about deconstruction.
They know, for instance; that deconstruction is :a challenge to the established ways of legal thought. They know that deconstruction is
radical in some unspecified way. Beyond that, however, they are not
sure. And so they ask: What is deconstruction?
In a sense, this appears to be a perfectly innocent question. And
yet for the deconstructionist, the question is far from innocent. And
so the deconstructionist might answer the question as follows:
"What is deconstruction?" It is important to answer this question
*

Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D. 1978 UCLA

School of Law. Copyright by Pierre Schlag 1990 (All rights reserved). I wish to thank Jack
Balkin for his genuine intellectual interest and candor in discussing the matters in this article
- particularly given that I am critical of some stances he has taken. Thanks as well go to
David Carlson, David Eason, and Steve Smith for their .omments on a draft of this piece and
for conversations on the state of current legal thought. I am very grateful to Steve Winter who
pushed this article and my thinking along and who was very generous with his suggestions, his
time, and his discussion.
I This slogan is often translated as "There is nothing outside the text." This translation
has often produced the mistaken impression that Derrida is saying something like "everything
is text," or "text is all there is." See Edmundson, The Ethics of Deconstruction, 27 Mich. Q.
Rev. 622, 629 (1988). A better translation of Derrida's slogan (albeit a less elegant'one) might
be, "There is no outside of the text." This in turn would mean, inter alia, that all that is
accessible as knowledge is mediated by the text (and whatever characteristics, textuality may
have) and/or that whatever can be known as such must have the capacity to be textually
comprehensible.
2 J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 312 (1980).
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on its own terms. Already we know from the question, something
about the shape that an "intellectually serious" answer is expected
to take. We know, for instance, that the normal expectations are
that deconstruction will be a "what," in other words, "a something"-with all that is implied in being "a something," including
substantiality, unity, essence, singularity. The question asked, after all, is not: "What are deconstructions?" Still less, "How is
deconstruction?" So the very posing of the question "What is
deconstruction?" already invokes and confirms a series of privileged categorial matrices to define an acceptable answer, that is, an
"intellectually serious" answer.... The question is thus already an
establishment of a certain politics of discourse-a definition of the
acceptable bounds of discourse, a delimitation, a structuration of
the field of acceptable (i.e. "serious") intellectual discourse....
Now, the interesting thing about this sort of answer, is the kind of
reaction it will often trigger in the very legal thinkers who first asked,
"What is deconstruction?" Faced with this sort of answer, these legal
thinkers will often be annoyed and will often react dismissively. They
will react dismissively for the simple reason that the answer presented
is not the sort of "answer" they had in mind. It is not the sort of
"answer" they intended.3 For them, the deconstructionist answer is
evasive. It is not straightforward.
These reactions are perfectly understandable. Indeed they are
perfectly sensible-sensible, that is, within the framework of traditional legal discourse. Yet ironically, these dismissive reactions by
legal thinkers are a rhetorical confirmation of precisely what the
deconstructionist said above.' Indeed, these dismissive reactions confirm that the question "What is deconstruction?" is not just a question-but also an affirmative political act regulating the rhetorical
paths that the intellectual traffic in questions and answers must take.
As such, the question already constitutes the shape the answer must
assume if that answer is going to be admissible within the norms of
traditional legal discourse.
That the asking of such a seemingly trivial question-("What is
deconstruction?")--can be seen as a political act, as a manifestation of
3 As Charles Yablon argues, a question is an expression of its author's desire. Yablon,
The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6
Cardozo L. Rev. 917, 928 (1985). And desire is itself always already structured.
4 We find like a rule of speech or textual rule, that the question can be inscribed only
in the form dictated by the answer which awaits it, that is, which did not wait for
it. It need only be asked how the answer has prescribed the form of the question
- not according to the necessary, conscious, and calculated anticipation of someone who is conducting a systematic expose but somehow unawares.
J. Derrida, Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language, in Speech and
Phenomena and Other Essays On Husserl's Theory of Signs 126 (1973).
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social power congealed in linguistic forms, no doubt comes as news to
traditional legal thinkers. Indeed, as legal thinkers, it may even come
as news to us. It may come as news to us precisely because, as legal
thinkers, we are almost completely unaccustomed to thinking of linguistic form as a matter of politics. What's more, we are particularly
unaccustomed to thinking of the linguistic form of our own legal
thought as a matter of politics.
We are unaccustomed to thinking in all these ways precisely because traditional legal discourse deprivileges and subordinates form.
Indeed, at whatever level of abstraction traditional legal discourse operates-whether it be doctrine, theory, or hermeneutics-traditional
legal discourse immediately proceeds to the "substantive" discussion
of its object without pausing to consider the form within which that
"substantive" discussion has already been framed.
But this is hardly surprising. On the contrary, traditional legal
discourse routinely conceives (and almost invariably) treats the grammer and elements of its own discourse-the words, the sentences-as
if they were weightless inconsequential forms allowing the transmission of any important "substantive" rational meaning.' By trivializing
form in this way, traditional legal discourse represses inquiry into its
own form. To the extent that the form of traditional legal discourse is
treated as weightless, inconsequential, it is also treated as neutral-in
5 Legal thought is hardly alone in treating language this way.

For a discussion of the

ways in which our general language re-presents language as an empty form-a conduit for
"substance," see Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language
about Language, in Metaphor and Thought 284 (A. Ortony ed. 1988).

As Reddy shows, we are often trying to get our thoughts across better and so we try to
pack our thoughts in as few words as possible, though sometimes our sentences arefilled with
too many thoughts and the result is that the reader has great difficulty extracting the meaning.
Id. at 287-90.

As these examples, drawn from Reddy's work demonstrate, our metaphorical descriptions
of language cognitively establish language as an empty conduit, a vehicle for "substantive"
meaning and thought. As Reddy demonstrates, not only does the conduit construction of
language create a false understanding of communication, but it produces significant social pathology as well:

This model of communication objectifies meaning in a misleading and dehumanizing fashion. It influences us to talk and think about thoughts as if they had the
same kind of external intersubjective reality as lamps and tables. Then when this
presumption provides dramatically false in operations there seems to be nothing to
blame except our own stupidity and malice.
Id. at 308.

For what will no doubt become part of the seminal work introducing such cognitivelinguistic insights to legal thought, see Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan.
L. Rev. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Bull Durham]; Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (1989); Winter, The

Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 2225 (1989).
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other words, neither here nor there. And being neither here nor
there, it is, of course, not worth talking about--or so it appears from
the perspective of traditional legal discourse.
What is interesting about this repression of form is that the repression is itself effectuated by means of form. What we have here is a
nested repression: the repression of the repression. Not only does legal
discourse repress inquiry into its own form, but this repression is repressed in the very form of traditional legal discourse. Indeed, in its
very form, traditional legal discourse has already framed its own form
as an empty conduit, a mere vehicle, a container for "substantive"
thought. In other words, the form of traditional legal discourse has
already relegated its own form to the status of the secondary, the derivative, the trivial. Not surprisingly, the substantive dimension of
traditional legal discourse follows suit: the substantive self-representation of traditional legal discourse affirms that form is subordinate and
secondary to so-called "important" normative legal concerns and
commitments-whether it be rule of law, or justice, efficiency, or
whatever.
The short of it is: the power of traditional legal discourse to repress inquiry into its own form is awesome. Not only does traditional
legal discourse repress its own form (at both the formal and substantive levels), but having accomplished this repression, it then conveniently "forgets" that there has been any repression of form at all.
Having thus dismissed rhetoric and form from the stage, having instituted this dismissal in its very own rhetorical form, and finally having
"forgotten" both of these moves, it is no wonder that traditional legal
discourse cannot recognize its own politics.'
What then are the politics of deconstruction in law? What political implications does deconstruction yield for law? This essay has
already begun to provide some answers to these questions. 7 Part of
6 This "forgetting" by traditional legal discourse that it has already dismissed form from
the stage, helps explain why the question "What is deconstruction?" seems so innocent to
traditional legal thinkers. It seems innocent for traditional legal thinkers precisely because its
form has already been "forgotten."
This "forgetting" also helps to explain why traditional legal thought has been so resistant
to the otherwise transparently correct cls observation that law is politics. It is part of the
political character of traditional legal thought to exclude and marginalize certain ideas,
images, concepts, etc., and to do so in a way which systematically "forgets" that there has been
any exclusion. So not only does traditional legal discourse purge law of the political, but it
"forgets" that it has done so. But, of course, both the purge and the forgetting are themselves
quintessentially political acts.
7 The short formulaic version of the answer goes like this: Contemporary legal thought is,
in its form (and sometimes its substance), given to a methodological and ontological individu-
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the answer still to come is that deconstruction seeks to challenge and
subvert our image of the political. In other words, deconstruction
seeks to displace our pre-formed view of the identity, the form, and
the location of the political.' Deconstruction seeks to effectuate this
displacement and subversion by engaging our tacit understanding of
what constitutes the political ...

and accordingly everything else as

well. In law, deconstruction is thus a kind of engagement with traditional legal discourse-an engagement that seeks to subvert the categorial regimes in force within that discourse. As Derrida puts it:
What is somewhat hastily called deconstruction is not, if it is of
any consequence, a specialized set of discursive procedures, still
less the rules of a new hermeneutic method that works on texts or
utterances in the shelter of a given and stable institution. It is also,
at the very least, a way of taking a position, in its work of analysis,
concerning the political and institutional structures that make possible and govern our practices, our competencies, our performances. Precisely because it is never concerned only with signified
content, deconstruction should not be separable from this politicoinstitutional problematic and should seek a new investigation of
responsibility, an investigation which questions the codes inherited
from ethics and politics. This means that, too political for some, it
will seem paralyzing for those who only recognize politics by the
most familiar road signs. Deconstruction is neither a methodological reform that should reassure the organization in place nor a
alism. As a matter of form, the author of contemporary legal thought invariably situates his
(very coherent, self-directing, and largely autonomous) self outside the text-outside the text

of social relations, outside the text of academic production, outside the text of history and
psychology, etc. In a phrase: le hors de texte, c'est moi. This methodological and ontological
individualism embedded in the very form of legal thought is redistributed and reproduced in
the reader and in the consumers of legal thought. This methodological and ontological individualism is associated and supports a number of ideological commitments that become unbelievable (if not silly) once articulated in substantive terms:
-The conceit that legal thinkers are in control of their own thoughts
-the assumption that theory is sharply distinct from practice and somehow governs practice from some safe and stable place outside practice
-the view that substance governs form
-etc.
Despite the transparent silliness of these conceits (once articulated) they remain embedded in
the very form of traditional legal thought. Not surprisingly, they regularly slip out into its
"substance".
8 When, therefore, both Marx and Derrida speak of the necessity of reconsidering
the way we fashion categories-through what procedures, on what grounds, for
what ends-it is because such categories as "the economic" [or the "political"]
falsely represent the world by positing nonexistent homogeneous grounds that reduce out complex relations and forces that are not amenable to simple categorical
representation as homogeneous entities and that require what Marx calls a different mode of exposition.
M. Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction 102 (1982).
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flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible making destruction,
whose most certain effect would be to leave everything as it is and
to consolidate the most immobile forces within the university.'
If engagement of the traditional discourse describes the project of
deconstruction, then deconstruction can fail in (at least) two ways.
First, deconstruction can fail because it becomes too challenging, too
heretical, too much of a departure from accepted discursive practices.' ° In this case, deconstruction can fail because the traditional
discourse will identify and marginalize deconstruction as unintelligible, as absurd, as beyond the pale.I' Deconstruction, however, can
also fail in a second and perhaps more interesting manner. Deconstruction can fail to engage if it becomes subsumed and coopted by
the categorial regimes of traditional legal discourse.' 2
It is this latter possibility-this possibility of failure by cooption
that is of concern here. This possibility of the cooption of deconstruction is intimately related to the question of the politics of deconstruction. It is related because the politics of deconstruction in law (if any)
will depend precisely on what the politics of traditional legal discourse do to deconstruction and vice versa.
If traditional legal discourse succeeds in transforming deconstruction into just another technique, just another theory, just another
method for making arguments, then deconstruction will have no particular politics-which is to say that it will have the conservative effect of preserving the politics of the status quo. Deconstruction will
become powerless to displace and subvert the categorial regime in
force precisely because it will have become subsumed with that very
same categorial regime-the one that systematically transforms intel9 Derrida, The Contest of Faculties, as cited in J. Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and

Criticism After Structuralism 156 (1982). I had wanted to put in italics for emphasis in this
quote. But as it turned out, I wanted to emphasize each and every sentence.
10 Richard Posner, who seems clearly interested in making deconstruction fail, has adopted

exactly this strategy in his efforts to exclude deconstruction from legal thought. See R. Posner,

Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 213-220, 215 (1988) ("The relevance of all this
for law is obscure... the purposes and techniques of authors of literary texts are different from
those of the authors of legal texts.") See also, Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 259, 372-73 (1987) (noting that insofar as deconstruction assumes "a willingness to put
aside normal analysis and ideology, an effort to effect delegitimation through deconstruction

inappropriately assumes in its reader the presence of the very attitude it is trying to bring
about.")
1 See Winter, Indeterminacy & Incommensurability in Constitutional Law (forthcoming
in 78 Cal. L. Rev.)
12 To some degree, these two paths of failure correspond to the dead ends already de-

scribed by Derrida. Indeed Derrida has noted that deconstruction must "avoid both simply
neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing within the closed field
of these oppositions, thereby confirming it." J. Derrida, Positions 41 (1981).
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lectual endeavors into just another technique, just another theory, just
another method. If deconstruction is subsumed in this way, then it
will have failed to challenge (let alone, displace) the practices of traditional legal discourse. If this happens (which it very well might), then
deconstruction will have been successfully coopted by traditional legal
discourse.
I think it is easy to see how this cooption might happen. There is
at work within the very practice of traditional legal discourse a fairly
crude and powerful rhetorical subject-object economy. Traditional
legal discourse rhetorically establishes the self of the legal thinker as a
privileged individual subject--as the author of his own thoughts, the
captain of his own ship, the Hercules of his own empire. 13 Constituted
as a privileged individual subject, the legal thinker systematically
treats any new knowledge (whether it be microeconomics or deconstruction) as just another technique, just another method, just another
thoroughly objectified resource-field for legal arguments. This rhetorical economy is so powerful that even when the legal thinker encounters some knowledge that is transparently anti-methodological or
anti-instrumentalist, the legal thinker will, often as not, nonetheless
deploy this new knowledge in a methodological, instrumentalist way.
And, in one sense, nothing could be more natural: in a discourse that
systematically instructs and constructs its readers and writers to
deprivilege their own form, these sorts of cannibalistic transformations are exactly the sort of thing to be expected. 1" Indeed, if your
discourse systematically represses form, one would expect your transformations to be a little weird.
The importance of this rhetorical economy on the character of
traditional legal thought is difficult to overstate. One result of this
rhetorical economy is that, at least since the time of Langdellt 5 and
virtually without interruption since, traditional legal discourse has
systematically rejected any serious consideration of the social, the psychological, and the rhetorical context of its own productions.1 6 On
13 This establishment of the individual subject is at once evidenced in and enforced by the

American stylistic insistence on using the active voice in "good writing"-an insistence that
one encounters fairly often in the student law review editing process. One of the less innocent
consequences of this "merely stylistic" insistence is that individual subjects are unthinkingly
established as the authors-that is, the agents--of all noteworthy social, political and epistemological acts.
14 See Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction,
40 Stan. L. Rev. 929 (1988) [hereinafter Cannibal Moves].
15 This rhetorical economy, of course, antedates Langdell-but Langdell provides an apt
marker to symbolize the emergence of this rhetorical economy within American academic
legal thought.
16 Since the time of Langdell, American legal thought has produced two well-known move-

1638

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1631

the contrary, there has been a sustained tendency on the part of the
legal thinker to exteriorize, and correspondingly objectify all legal
problems, issues, and solutions. The sustained drive within legal
thought, at least since Langdell, has been to produce instrumentally
useful legal knowledge without, of course, any serious consideration
of the desirability of this instrumentalist paradigm of intellectual production.17 Regardless of their identity, the knowledges wielded by the
legal thinker (i.e., sociology, psychology, rhetoric, etc.) have almost
always been turned outward-in a manner that exempts the legal
thinker himself from the reach of these knowledges. Indeed, the very
form of traditional legal discourse systematically renews and replenishes the pleasant Langdellian fantasy that, in his role as authorized
legal speaker, the legal thinker is outside the reach of these
knowledges.
Now, this systematic exteriorization, this unwillingness to interrogate the legal subject, is not just some intellectual failing on the part
of the legal thinker. Rather, the legal thinker has been rhetorically
constructed this way by the very legal texts he reads and writes."8
The very form of legal discourse exempts him (the judge, the legal
academic, the lawyer, the law student) from considering the social,
psychological, rhetorical status of his own legal thought.
The legal thinker speaks from a position of authority and while
he is speaking in role-that is, while he is at the podium-he will as a
matter ofform present the self that is speaking-that is, his self-as
an autonomous, coherent, integrated, originary self capable of rational argument and moral choice. Later on, out in the hall, in informal conversation, the legal thinker will, of course, readily admit that
he is just as much a fit subject for sociological, economic, psychoanaments that have attempted to direct the attention of legal thought to its own social or rhetorical situation: legal realism and critical legal studies. Both of these movements have been met
with widespread pathological responses throughout the academy-leading to loss or denial of
jobs and the retardation of the intellectual development of legal thought.

17 This description of the legal academy's sustained and unexamined commitment to the
production of instrumentally useful legal knowledge is consistent with Lyotard's description of
"performativity" as the criterion for modern (not postmodern) science. Lyotard, The
Postmodern Condition: A Report On Knowledge 46 (1979) ("The production of proof... thus
falls under the control of another language game, in which the goal is no longer truth, but
performativity-that is, the best input/output equation .... Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to find truth, but to augment power.").
For a demonstration of the significance of the critical legal studies attempt to understand
and resist the instrumentalization of (legal) thought and culture, see Binder, Beyond Criticism,

55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 888 (1988).
18 With only a few exceptions, I have more or less deliberately used the male pronoun to
describe the traditional legal thinker. Traditional legal thought strikes me as essentially a male
production-and it would seem perverse to hold women responsible for its character.
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lytic explanations as the next guy. But when he is doing law, when he
is in role, the rhetorical form of his statements will effectively deny all
these twentieth-century knowledges in favor of eighteenth-century
Lockean fantasies. What's more, the legal thinker will invite the authorized audience (i.e., other members of the legal community) to
participate in the same fantasies: the members of this authorized audience will be treated and thus constituted as autonomous, coherent,
integrated, ordinary selves capable of rational argument and moral
choice.
The intellectual consequences of these rhetorical conceits are extremely important. 9 Indeed, even when significant substantive efforts
are made to focus legal thought on late twentieth-century social life,
on the postmodern condition, even then, the aesthetic, the form, of
legal thought often remains captive to eighteenth-century metaphysics. At the level of form, the self of the legal thinker remains autonomous, self-directing, coherent, integrated and originary-in short, as
if it were the autonomous author of its very own thoughts. These
tacit assumptions of form yield some bizarre intellectual creations.
Unfortunately, it is difficult for us to apprehend the bizarre and
wondrous character of these creations because, we are complicit in the
very reproduction of precisely these wondrous ,creations. And'thus,
rather than considering them bizarre, we often consider these creations routine. More accurately, we don't consider them at all: they
are our routine.2 °
Among the sort of intellectual work we consider routine-indeed
the very height of seriousness-are, for instance, historical accounts
offered by legal thinkers who boldly situate themselves outside of (or
ever so conveniently at the end of) history.2 ' Similarly, we routinely
accept as normal social science work done by legal thinkers whose
19 For one thing they lead to a great deal of misunderstanding. For instance, the cis claims
of contradiction have been misunderstood by many legal thinkers (opponents and adherents)
precisely because these thinkers have been unable to apprehend that the contradictions traverse the very self of the legal thinker (i.e., them). They have been unable, in other words, to
understand that the cls claim is that there is no place for the self to stand outside of the
contradictions. Legal thinkers are often incapable of thinking such self-decentering thoughts
precisely because as academic professionals, their self, their individual subjectivity, has always
already been put off limits.
20 For a discussion of the routine of normative legal thought, see Schlag, Normative and
Nowhere To Go, 43 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Normative and Nowhere To Go].

For a discussion of the general significance of routine in social interaction, see P. Wohlmuth &
L. Goldberg, The Significance of Routine in the Operation of Human Regulatory Systems:
Reexamining the Relationship of ADR to Law (forthcoming in Dispute Processing: Legal and
Anthropological Perspectives (B. Aginsky, M. Lowy, V. Rohrl & D. Wesckstein, eds. 1991).
21 For discussion and criticism of this trend, see Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan.
L. Rev. 57 (1984)..
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thought processes and occupational situation are themselves apparently immune from the effects of social forces.2 2 We have seen structuralist accounts transformed into transcendental truths announced
by speakers who are apparently (and quite mysteriously) outside the
deep structure.2 3 In sum, we routinely treat ourselves as if we were
outside the historical, the social, the structuralist text.
And now that deconstruction is making its appearance in law, we
face the very real possibility that the law's formal answer to Derrida's
"II n'y a pas de hors de texte" will be, once again, yet another instantiation of the legal thinker's favorite refrain: "Le hors de texte, c'est
moi." In other words, the risk is that, at the very moment that deconstruction is making its entry into the law, the legal thinker will once
again situate his self outside the reach of deconstruction. This is not a
hypothetical or a remote risk. The reason it is neither hypothetical
nor remote is that, as legal thinkers, we are all enmeshed in this selfindulgent traditional discourse. And since there is no question of
making a radical rupture with this traditional discourse 2 4 -neither as
reader, nor author-the legal texts are always already constituting
and confirming us in the privileging of our self as rational, coherent,
and originary. In its formal structure, traditional discourse systematically reproduces and confirms each of us in the privileging of our own
individual self. 25 The irony is that even when we seek to displace the
grammar and matrices of traditional legal discourse, they often reenlist even our best subversive efforts within their own formal struc22 For criticism of this trend, see Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 617-18 (1984).
23 For criticisms of this tendency, see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 15-16, 36-37 (1984).
24 For Derrida's description of the problematic and ambivalent situation of deconstruction
with regard to radical breaks, see J.Derrida, The Ends of Man, in Margins of Philosophy 135
(1982).
25 For this reason, it is not enough to become self-conscious of this systematic process. To
be sure, self-consciousness may help. It may even be necessary. But self-consciousness here is
not enough. What is required is a displacement, a subversion of the discursive practices that
constitute each of us. What is required is deconstruction.
In this connection, it seems that the arguments of some cls scholars about the ideological
role of traditional legal discourse must be pushed further. There has been a tendency in some
cls scholarship to assume that the self-conscious recognition that traditional legal discourse is
mystifying will instance the dissolution of this mystification. But this is not so-neither at the
social nor the individual level.
For instance, the recognition that the general practice of reification in legal thought yields
legally unnecessary and politically conservative results does not imply that one can extirpate
reification for one's thought processes. It is only if one assumes in conformity with the dominant ideology that legal thinkers are always already in control of their thinking processes, that
such a conclusion would follow. Once one abandons this extreme philosophical idealism, the
conclusion doesn't follow: reification is a cognitive process-and epistemological insights into
the nature of reification can only do so much (depending on the context) to modify cognitive

1990]

POLITICS OF FORM

1641

ture. Thus, even as we try to advance subject-decentering knowledges
(like deconstruction) within traditional legal discourse, the latter reasserts its own formal rhetorical structure and re-establishes both reader
and author as privileged individual subjects.
By way of example, consider Jack Balkin's pioneering account of
deconstruction in law, entitled DeconstructivePracticeand Legal Theory.2 6 Balkin's article quite rightly begins with the caveat that deconstruction is not a "philosophical position" or "a creed"-i.e., not the
sort of thing that can be chosen or wielded by a privileged individual
self.2 7 Instead, Balkin properly insists on treating deconstruction as
"a practice"-as even the title of his article indicates. But as the article proceeds, the metamorphosis begins. Slowly but surely deconstruction slips away from its role as a practice. Instead, Balkin begins
to treat deconstruction in a more instrumental way, as a technique
deployed by a self-conscious individual subject. For instance, midway
through the article Balkin writes:
[T]he deconstructionist must engage in a process of self-reflection
to determine when the insights provided by deconstruction have
produced sufficient enlightenment with respect to a view of law,
legal doctrine ....This decision is, of course, apoliticaland moral
choice, but it is one informed by insights gained through the activity of deconstruction itself. At the moment the choice is made, the
critical theorist is, strictly speaking, no longer a deconstructionist.
However,
the purposes of engaging in the deconstruction have been
28
served.

And by the end of Balkin's article, deconstruction is no longer a practice at all: rather, as Balkin puts it, "[d]econstruction by its very nature is an analytic tool ....
Balkin's article thus illustrates the way in which (despite the best
and most careful "substantive" intentions) deconstruction can come
to be defined and confined by an already-in-place instrumentalist ideology-an ideology which at once depicts and constitutes morally
charged individual subjects as competent choosers of normatively
frameworks. See Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1195
(1989) [hereinafter Missing Pieces].
At the same time, however, it would be a serious mistake to conclude that critical selfconsciousness is of no political consequence for changing our practices. See Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 5 (arguing against Stanley Fish that critical self-consciousness is politically
and socially necessary in modifying our practices).
26 Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743 (1987).
27 Id. at 745-46 (citing Jonathan Culler and Christopher Norris for the same sort of
proposition).
28 Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 786.
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empty intellectual techniques. In the case of Balkin's description of
deconstruction, this ideology puts the individual self in charge of
choosing when to deploy deconstruction, when to end deconstruction,
and what purposes to use deconstruction for. The net effect of this
ideology, then, is to insulate the self, and the rhetoricity of the self
from the subversive reach of deconstruction.
Balkin's account of deconstruction is an excellent and sophisticated account of the dominant paradigm of deconstruction practiced
within critical legal studies. Indeed, the formalization of deconstruction into a set of operating procedures deployed by a radically free
individual subject is typical (though not exhaustive) of cls deconstruction.3 ° This tendency to formalize and thereby domesticate deconstruction into a set of stereotyped techniques or operating procedures
is largely an outgrowth of a dominant cls paradigm that combines a
thoroughly structuralist understanding of social and legal thought
with a self-consciously contradictory affirmation of a radical individual subjectivism. 3 1 In its very best moments, this cls paradigm demonstrates important and largely unanswered insights into the
relatively underdeveloped condition and the outlandish epistemological pretensions of contemporary legal thought (i.e., the sort of
thought we are all enmeshed in-one way or another).32 In one sense,
30 See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L.J.
997 (1985); Feinman, A Case Study in Critical Contract Law, 1988 Ann. Survey An. Law
273, 275-76. For a counterexample, see Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction (Book Review), 94 Yale L.J. 209 (1984).
31 It is, of course, possible that I am misunderstanding what I take to be the dominant
paradigm within cis-and that critical legal thought does not seek to canonize or elevate the
radically free individual subject. Misunderstanding on this score is extremely easy. It is extremely easy because (particularly within the legal community) we lack strong, widely shared
markers to designate stages of development of the subject.
In a recent article, I have described stages of development of the legal subject while simultaneously describing the difficulties attending such a task and also trying to develop some
rhetorical strategies for overcoming these difficulties. See, Missing Pieces, supra note 25. My
sense is that it does little good simply to describe stages of development of the subject. It does
little good because those subjects that are not very far along, tend to (mis)understand later
stages of development within the forms of earlier stages of development of the subject. As
Heidegger put it:
We shall never learn what "is called" swimming, for example, or what it "calls
for," by reading a treatise on swimming. Only the leap into the river tells what is
called swimming. The question "What is called thinking?" can never be answered
by proposing a definition of the concept thinking, and then diligently explaining
what is contained in that definition.
M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking 21 (1968).
32 See Kennedy, Comment on Rudolf Wietholter's "Materialization and Proceduralization
in Modern Law" and "Proceduralization of the Category of Law", in Critical Legal Thought:
An American-German Debate 511 (C. Joerges & D. Trubek eds. 1989).
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this demonstration is consistent with the Derridean enterprise.3 3 It is
admirable insofar as it effectively resists and overcomes the hypostatizing and homeostatic effects of disciplinary knowledges including,
most topically, law. In its very worst moments, however, this dominant cls paradigm does nothing of the sort. In its worst moments, it
succeeds quasi-comically in dogmatically establishing the cls thinker
as a radically free subject while reducing everyone else to the unenviable status of a mere vehicle for the reiteration of fairly crude structuralist patterns: radical individual subjectivism for me and objectified
mindlessness for you... (I win-you lose).
Either way, best or worst, the irony remains. And the irony is
that by putting the individualist self in charge of deconstruction, legal
discourse (once again) re-establishes what Derrida derides as "the full
presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin, the end of play." 34
The self has been put outside the challenge of deconstruction and thus
it remains a self-assured, coherent, integrated, rational, originary
source of moral and political action. But to put the self outside the
text in this way, turns deconstruction on its head. 3 More precisely, it
sends deconstruction reeling back to the eighteenth-century metaphysics of the individual and his reason as the origin of truth, morals,
etc.36
And yet, of course, it is easy for the legal thinker to put his or her
self outside the text. It has already been done. All the legal thinker
See Edmundson, supra note 1, at 629:
The epistemological pride that comes with the notion that you can refine away
more and more of what is contingent on the way to seeing things in their full
presence and truth is the pride that Derrida most wants to dislodge. Derrida's
target is epistemological hubris, in much the way Marx's target was the hubris of
bourgeois prosperity and Freud's the hubris of "civilized sexual morality."
34 J. Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in Writing
and Difference 278, 292 (1978).
35 Edmundson, supra note 1, at 628. ("The self, moreover, which has been conventionally
conceived of as potentially stable and potentially unified, is here called into doubt. For if the
activity of reading, or of being in the world, is constituted by the play of differences, then what
is called the self is similarly in flux.").
36 Allan Hutchinson aptly describes this cooption of deconstruction in American literary
scholarship:
Unfortunately, American literary scholarship has grossly misapplied this radical
critique and blunted its critical edge .... Domesticated and neutralized, [deconstruction] has been reduced to a tamed dogma of textual nihilism. In its American
mutant form, "unbounded free play" is premised on an unconstrained individualat-large who designates meaning at will, an eternal signifier. It has been put to
work within the very metaphysical process that it is intended to disrupt. In its
text-centered, abstract, and ahistorical focus, Deconstruction shares much with
the discredited New Criticism.
Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Destruction (Book Review), 94 Yale
L.J. 209, 230-31 (1984).
33
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has to do--all I have to do-all you have to do-is do what Stanley
Fish says comes naturally."' All each of us has to do is simply understand deconstruction as just another technique, just another approach,
just another argumentative resource that each of us can deploy when
or where each of us wishes. This is extremely easy for the legal
thinker to do. As an already constituted privileged individual self, the
legal thinker is always already prepared to objectify any intellectual
activity into a technique, a tool. Indeed, insofar as he is an unconstrained originary subjectivity, all intellectual activity is always already at his willful disposal. Since he is constructed as the origin of
choice and of meaning, all intellectual activities must perforce be
subordinate to his choice and his meaning.
This rhetorical economy (of self and technique) is a reciprocal
one, which means that it can be described the other way around as
well. Since the action of the privileged individual self always already
objectifies intellectual activity into techniques, tools, resources, etc.,
these are stripped of intrinsic normative value. The resulting emptiness of these texts creates a demand for a meaning-conferring subjectivity. Indeed, all these thoroughly objectified techniques, methods,
approaches, create an economic demand for a morally charged subjectivity--one that is outside the text and can give such texts meaning,
significance, life. And in our (legal) culture, this morally charged subjectivity happens to be rhetorically constructed as an individual one
(you, me, etc.).
There is thus a powerful rhetorical economy here--one which
links in a reciprocal manner the privileging of the individualist self
and the reduction of intellectual activity to the objectified status nf
techniques, methods, theories, etc. 38 This is a simple symbiotic subject-object economy---one where the text is thoroughly objectified and
subjectivity is purportedly located outside the text.
In the case of deconstruction, this already constituted rhetorical
subject-object economy institutes a double misunderstanding of
deconstruction.39 First, it misapprehends deconstruction tout court.
Second, it inscribes this misapprehension within the text of decon37 All we have to do-to put the self outside the text-is to be like the academics Stanley
Fish describes and routinely skewers. S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (1989).
38 This rhetorical economy constitutes part of the structure of the "rationalism" that I try
to expose and displace. See Missing Pieces, supra note 25, at 1210-13, 1243-47.
39 One might call this movement an ironic reversal of Derrida's "double gesture." Derrida, supra note 12, at 41-42, 46-47 (1981) (on the "double gesture").
Derrida states that deconstruction must "avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby
confirming it." Id. at 41. Accordingly, a "double gesture" is required. One phase of this
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struction itself. The result is that deconstruction is re-presented as
precisely what it is not: as a technique, as a theory, as a tool, etc. This
result is at once ironic and perverse because, as Derrida makes clear,
deconstruction is not just some technique, theory, tool to be deployed
by self-directing privileged individualistselves whenever and wherever
they choose. On the contrary, as Derrida says in Positions:
The incision of deconstruction which is not a voluntary decision or
an absolute beginning, does not take place just anywhere, or in an
absolute elsewhere. An incision, precisely, it can be made only according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are localizable
in the discourse to be deconstructed.40
But despite Derrida's caution, the risk is great that in the midst of, or
even throughout a deconstruction, the legal thinker will nonetheless
insist that "Le hors de texte, c'est moi." This risk is great precisely
because our legal texts (quite paradoxically) constitute each of us as
privileged individual selves. And the thing is: it is extremely difficult
to give up this exceedingly flattering self-image. It is a very addictive
self-image-and, from a certain point of view, one that is not without
certain advantages. Indeed, this rhetorical self-image has the distinct
advantages (for that self) of putting the self outside any already inscribed and delimiting
history
practice
form
writing...
while, simultaneously, bestowing upon this self the power to create its
own ruling...
reason
theory
substance
speech.
Looking at these two columns, it seems clear that putting the self
hors de texte in this way succeeds in reinscribing precisely the sort of
hierarchical oppositions that Derridean deconstruction seeks to subvert (including speech/writing, substance/form, theory/practice,
etc.). To put the self hors de texte in this way is to authorize the
double gesture entails overturning or reversing the hierarchical oppositions. Another phase

entails marking or reinscribing the displacement, the interval that arises from the reversal.
Those two "phases" are not to be understood in a chronological relation. Nor are these
phases to be understood in terms of a naive subject-object model whereby some privileged
interpretive individual subject mechanically overturns the hierarchical dualities in a thoroughly objectified text.
40 Derrida, supra note 12, at 82 (emphasis added).
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cooption of deconstruction. It is to undo deconstruction in the very
act of purportedly practicing deconstruction. It is to ensure that
deconstruction will have no particular politics and no particular implications that traditional legal thought need worry about.
Indeed, ideas, theories, etc. are not dangerous-they are not consequential-unless they can change people's cognitive-social practices.
And there is no reason to suppose that anyone's cognitive or social
practices will necessarily or even generally be transformed simply because he or she comes to hold or mouth some new radical "substantive" idea, theory, method, technique.4 ' To believe that "substantive"
ideas, theories, methods, etc. do have such power is to remain caught
within the pervasive ideological overstatement that substance controls
form and theory governs practice. It is to assume-in complete accordance with the ruling ideology-that one's thoughts can control
one's cognitive practices in an automatic unproblematic sort of way.42
Thus, as between changing someone's theory, their ideas, etc. on
the one hand or changing, their cognitive practices on the other-the
more important intellectual and political endeavor would seem to be
the latter. Theories come and go. Ideas are a dime a dozen. Prescriptive and normative ideas are even cheaper. People get them all the
time-hence, the saying "There ought to be a law .... " But the problem with theories, and ideas, etc. is that they very often leave cogni41 1 choose the underlined words carefully because I do not want to say as much as Stanley
Fish seems at times to say: namely, that self-consciousness of one's thought processes is irrelevant to political change. I think that when Stanley Fish says that, he is wrong. It is an overstatement: it fails to consider the particular and context-specific relation between thought and
practice. In some situations, self-consciousness is remarkably effective at changing cognitive
practices. In other situations, it is not.
While I disagree with Stanley Fish, I also disagree with the sort of move sometimes seen
in cls work that assumes that self-consciousness can somehow dissipate constraint and adversity. One can, for instance, b- self-conscious that reification is an intellectually and generally
politically objectionable practice and yet remain quite incapable of avoiding reification.
In the higher stages of development of the subject, the subject becomes aware that it is
structured not just by language-but by the language games of language. As one achieves this
sort of understanding, one becomes aware that changing the character of the subject--of one's
self even-is not a matter of just thinking things through. It becomes a question of changing
the language structures, the institutions that create the subject. In other words, self-consciousness may be a great rhetorical opening for the development of the subject, until the later stages
when it appears to the subject that self-consciousness is simply no longer adequate. Further
development depends upon the subject (and hence the associated category of self-consciousness) being put in question. What is required for further development is the displacement of
the linguistic/institutional structures-i.e., precisely the sort of thing that deconstruction
sometimes seems to do.
For a discussion of self-consciousness, as limited by conditions of sedimentation and adversity, see Winter, supra note 11.
42 I have previously attempted to show that this is not the case. See Cannibal Moves, supra
note 14.
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tive practices undisturbed. As a result, theories, ideas, etc. are often
coopted, distorted, reified, and neutralized by being re-enveloped
within the same old cognitive practices. The move from Marx to
Lenin, from Coase to Posner, from Duncan Kennedy to [.... ]43 is the
same old rationalist move of enveloping dynamic accounts of subjectobject relations within a much more stabilized Cartesian form." Rationalism is very good at killing thought. And if one is to avoid producing intellectual creations that are already D.O.A., it becomes
crucial to trouble the already inscribed spaces, the pathways, by
which bureaucratic academic institutions channel (and kill) intellectual endeavor.
So what are the politics of deconstruction? Given that the rhetorical field in law is always already structured in a sedimented understanding of self and world, theory and practice, substance and form,
serious and nonserious, the politics of deconstruction are to expose
and exploit the fault lines in a manner that will subvert and displace
our image of the political. This means that answering the question
"what are the politics of deconstruction in law?" depends very much
on the shape of the encounter between deconstruction and the politics
of traditional legal discourse.
One possibility, of course, is that deconstruction will be coopted.
To some extent, this seems to have happened already in the field of
literary criticism where deconstruction seems to have taken its institutionally preformed pluralistic place among a variety of other approaches to literature (including new criticism, phenomenology,
structuralism, psychoanalytic criticism, etc.)
But, it is also quite possible (contrary to many of the intimations
thus far) that in law, deconstruction will not be coopted. It is quite
possible that deconstruction will engage and resist the politics of
traditional legal discourse and in so doing will displace that discourse.
One of the reasons, that deconstruction could very well resist cooption in law is that, perhaps more than any other critical enterprise,
deconstruction inscribes itself in opposition to the discursive mechanisms of cooption.
In what follows, I will sketch briefly the ways in which decon43

Pick the reified account of cis of your choice and plug it in here.

For an earlier discussion of the processes by which rationalism systematically envelops
other forms of cognitive practice in legal thought. See, Missing Pieces, supra note 25, at 122227.
44
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struction might engage and resist the categorial regimes in force in the
law's traditional discourse-i.e., the ways in which deconstruction
might avoid cooption. I will thus be showing the ways in which the
deconstructive enterprise might be conducted. That very demonstration, however, also entails a deconstruction of the formal ways in
which traditional legal discourse reproduces its own rhetorical images
of the self, of politics, of theory, of intellectual endeavor. Ironically,
this demonstration also charts the ways in which the rhetorical structure of the traditional legal discourse poses a very real risk of colonizing deconstruction. All of this is to say that deconstruction must start
everywhere at once. 5
Starting everywhere at once, of course, is one of the mad and
maddening aspects of Derridean deconstruction: In the very process
of its unfolding, deconstruction places in question not just one or even
a few, but a whole series of hierarchical oppositions that constrain,
enable, and organize discursive practice (i.e., writing/speech, serious/
nonserious, substance/form, theory/practice, etc.)." For deconstruction, there is no question (and no possibility) of focusing onjust one of
the logocentric hierarchies.4 7 The various hierarchical oppositions
45 Each concept, moreover, belongs to a systematic chain, and itself constitutes a

system of predicates. There is no metaphysical concept in and of itself. There is a
work-metaphysical or not--on conceptual systems. Deconstruction does not
consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a
conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual
order is articulated.
J. Derrida, Signature Event Context, in Margins of Philosophy, supra note 24, at 307, 329.
46 Very schematically: an opposition of metaphysical concepts (for example, speech/
writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed
immediately to a neutralization: it must, by means of a double gesture, a double
science, a double writing, practice an overturning of the classical opposition and a
general displacement of the system. It is only on this condition that deconstruction will provide itself the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions
it criticizes, which is also a field of nondiscursive forces.
Id. at 329.
My invocation of the classic Derridean dualities here is not to be understood as according
some privileged status to these dualities by virtue of some stabilized content that they might be
thought to possess. On the contrary, my own description of the rhetorical economy of traditional legal discourse is a much more decentered onke. For a short example, see Cannibal
Moves, supra note 14, at 962-63 ("Appendix 1: A List of Splits"). The claim that the rhetorical economy of traditional legal discourse is a decentered one does not mean that this economy
is without structure or organization. It is only the impoverished form of either/or thinking(which ironically is very much a part of the rhetorical economy of traditional legal thought)that would lead us to conclude erroneously that the decenteredness of any economy implies
that it is without structure or organization.
47 "Since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are taken from a syntax
and a system, every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics." Derrida, supra note 34, at 281.
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that deconstruction seeks to engage and subvert are all mutually supportive. All these hierarchical dualities are accomplices in a great
logocentric con.
One implication is that the subversive project of deconstruction
stands to be defeated if it fails to address, engage, and challenge the
rhetoricaleconomy of these various logocentric dualities. As Derrida
observes:
Once more we are not concerned with comparing the content of
doctrines, the wealth of positive knowledge; we are concerned,
rather, with discerning the repetition or the permanence at a
profound level of discourse of certain fundamental schemes and of
certain directive concepts. 48
This means that deconstruction cannot afford to transact in the accepted currency of discursive practice without simultaneously challenging the rates of exchange, the value of the currency, and the
metaphor of currency itself. To speak for instance, about the hierarchical dualism of speech and writing in terms that leave the other
hierarchical dualities in place (i.e., serious/nonserious, substance/
form, theory/practice, etc.) is to reinscribe at the very moment that
logocentrism is being challenged a logocentric understanding of the
deconstruction of the writing/speech duality. It is to confirm as a
matter of form, as a matter of practice-it is to confirm and reinscribe
in all those ways that traditional legal discourse considers nonserious
(but which are very serious indeed)-the logocentrism that deconstruction seeks to subvert and displace.4 9
The cooptive or, more precisely, the recuperative, powers of
logocentrism must not be underestimated. To underestimate these recuperative powers leads to the re-production of a bizarrely logocentric
deconstructionism. It leads to a deconstructionism that appears
deconstructionist in substance, but that is nonetheless encased in
logocentric form-a deconstructionism that succeeds in a suicidal
reinscription of precisely the sort of hierarchical dualities like substance/form that deconstruction seeks to subvert and displace. Most
insidious is that this logocentric deconstructionism would reinscribe
the hierarchical dualities in precisely those realms that are
subordinated, trivialized, and repressed by traditional discursive prac48

J. Derrida, The Linguistic Circle of Geneva, in Margins of Philosophy, supra note 24, at

153.
49 [D]econstruction cannot simply represent a shift from one concept to another,

since the infrastructures with which it aims to account for the specific aporias and
differences between the concepts must also account for the inability of concepts to
be purely metaphysical concepts, that is, to be concepts at all.
R. Gasch6, The Tain of the Mirror 165 (1986).
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tice-i.e., the realm of form, practice, writing-in short, the "nonserious" that deconstruction takes to be very serious indeed.
Deconstruction must thus (quite impossibly) start deconstructing
everywhere at once-including (and very importantly) at the place
that challenges the very concept of a beginning.5 ° And deconstruction must do all this by re-valuating that which traditional discursive
practice subordinates: what the discursive practice treats as nonserious, as marginal, as mere form, etc. This too is part of what makes
deconstruction so mad and so maddening to the uninitiated. To the
uninitiated, deconstruction apparently refuses to abide by even the
most commonplace and seemingly uncontroversial ground rules of
"normal" discourse.
This attempt by deconstruction for such extreme resistance to
logocentrism is, of course, dangerous. It invites the facile logocentric
dismissals that deconstruction is unintelligible, fanciful, or irrelevant.
In addressing the works of philosophy, Derrida has sought to avoid
such misunderstandings by an extraordinarily rigorous and meticulous reading of texts. In this sense (as well as others), Derridean
deconstruction is a participation in the philosophical enterprise; Derrida writes in a manner cognizable by the discipline of philosophy
while nonetheless placing that discipline, its presumptions, and its repressions into question.
Derrida engages the texts and the discursive practices he is discussing (and not just philosophical discourses) with particular attention for their specific and local character. This extremely attentive
and solicitous practice of rigorous engagement with the peculiar and
local character of a discursive practice is so pronounced in deconstruction that it might well be considered (in an ironic way) one of its
key distinguishing aspects."
If so, the question arises: can deconstruction be applied to law?
50 In fact what has been said of postmodern depth psychology might well be said of decon-

struction as well:
[Deconstruction] ... loses nothing by admitting that it is impossible. Those analysts who precipitously content themselves with this view lose nothing from having
to wait for the final analysis. For... [deconstruction], possibility would rather be
the danger; a danger of becoming a veritable set of rule-governed procedures,
methodic practices, formalized techniques, uniform standards, accessible
approaches.
Kugler & Lacan, Postmodern Depth Psychology and the Birth of the Self-Reflexive Subject, in
The Book of the Self 173, 183 (P. Young-Eisendrath & J. A. Hall eds. 1987).
51 I do not mean to say that other activities besides deconstruction are not attentive to the
peculiar and local character of discursive practice. I mean to say that deconstruction has gone
to extraordinary lengths-for some, clearly way too far-in problematizing and negotiating
this question of the universal and the local. For this reason, it would be wrong to assume that
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On what terms? And what is it that would be applied? In the sense in
which legal thought usually understands "application"-for instance,
in the sense of "applying the law to the facts" or in the sense of applying some foreign discipline to law-the answer will be that deconstruction cannot be "applied" to law. In other words, deconstruction
cannot be applied to law on the model of contemporary interdisciplinary work.
To "apply" deconstruction on the model of contemporary interdisciplinary work would succeed in putting beyond reach much of
what deconstruction would like to challenge and engage. It would be
a surrender to the very system of hierarchical dualities that deconstruction seeks to engage and subvert.
That deconstruction cannot be "applied" to law on the model of
"law and . . ." work becomes glaringly evident when one begins to
consider the rhetorical structure of such contemporary interdisciplinary work. Indeed, the form and practice of "law and . . ." work,
reveals that it often conceives its interdisciplinary mission largely as a
matter of applying the conceptual vocabulary and grammar of a foreign discipline (say, microeconomics) to the field of law. Fairly often,
this foreign import activity is fairly blunt business.
Typically, "law and,.. '.' work appearsto automatically bestow
upon the foreign discipline, the status of a constituting subjectivity.
In law and economics, for instance, it is economics that purports to
describe, organize, and explain law-not the other way around. Such
a privileging of the foreign discipline appears to result in an automatic
reduction of law to the status of an object-field subordinate to the
organizing taxonomy and grammar of the foreign discipline. Thus,
when microeconomics begins to describe, organize, and explain law, it
is a curiously dead law-a law devoid of interpretive possibilities. It
deconstruction in law must take the same shape, the same form or the same preoccupations
that it has taken in Derrida's treatment of philosophical texts.
On the contrary, Derrida insists that deconstruction must begin within the discursive
terrain:
[Deconstruction is an] .... incision, precisely [because] it can be made only according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are localizable in the discourse
to be deconstructed. The topical and technical determination of the most necessary sites and operators--beginnings, holds, levers, etc.-in a given situation depends upon an historicalanalysis. This analysis is made in the general movement
of the field, and is never exhausted by the conscious calculation of a "subject".
Derrida, supra note 12, at 82 (emphasis added).
There is, of course, some irony (and some tension) in Derrida's attempt here to offer in the
form of a general proposition the view that deconstruction must be appropriately attuned to
the local character of a given discursive practice. Nevertheless, the point remains that we are
not entitled to assume that deconstruction should or must take the same form, shape, or preoccupations in law, that it has taken in its encounters with philosophy.
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is quite literally object-like: thing-like, self-contained, unambiguous,
etc.5 2
In interdisciplinary work, this apparent privileging of the foreign
discipline and the corresponding subordination and objectification of
law occurs automatically. In other words, it occurs without thinking.
One result of this unthought and unexamined practice is that there is
not a great deal of consideration given as to how the two or more
53
previously distinct intellectual disciplines will merge or interface.
What is often missing from this interdisciplinary business is any significant consideration of how to negotiate the relation between the
foreign discipline and the law.5 4 On what terms, in what ways, on
what conditions, with what modifications or reservations does economics, or normative philosophy or literature or social science contribute something to law? These are questions that are rarely asked in
interdisciplinary work."
But, it is no surprise that these questions are rarely asked. It is
no surprise because even before interdisciplinary work encounters the
foreign discipline, even before it encounters Billy Budd or "price theory" or the Rawlsian difference principle, it is already launched in the
unreflective legal practice of applying authoritative knowledges to the
instrumental resolution of already given "normative" legal problems.
52 Duncan Kennedy, for instance, demonstrates how the integrity and determinacy of
much of law and economics'depends upon naive hypostatization of legal rules and entitlements. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L.
Rev. 387, 401-21 (1981).
53 One consequence of this, of course, is that all these bold interdisciplinary efforts remain
entrapped within the form and the agendas of traditional legal thought. Weisberg, The LawLiterature Enterprise, 1 Yale J. Law & Humanities 1, 47-62 (1988) (tracing the ways in whic:1
the law and literature works of both Richard Posner and James Boyd White remain confined
within the narrow agendas of traditional legal thought).
54 For instance, consider the following questions about law and economics. In case of a
conflict between legal reasoning and economic reasoning which form of reasoning should prevail? Whose ultimate authorities, whose categorial structure should prevail? More broadly,
how are the categorial structures of the two disciplines to be reconciled? To what extent
should radical revision or restructuring of one discipline be permitted for the very good reasons articulated in others? According to what criteria?
For a recent discussion of the problematic character of the conjunction of law and economics, see Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1661 (1989) [hereinafter Transaction Costs].
"5 But, of course, sometimes they are. See Weisberg, supra note 53 (law and literature);
Kennedy, supra note 52 (law and economics); Trubek & Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in
American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora's Box?, in Critical Legal Thought,
supra note 32, at 105 (law and empirical social science).
These citations are not intended to indicate that only critical legal studies scholars ask
such questions. But given that so much of the cls enterprise consists in exposing and displacing the anti-intellectual structuring character of academic disciplinary thinking, it is hardly
surprising that these sorts of questions about the status of interdisciplinary work would comprise a significant part of cls work.
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Typically (and not without some irony) these normative legal inquiries have already been framed and stabilized as "serious" intellectual
problems prior to any encounter with the foreign disciplines. So in a
curious way-in a curiously nonsubstantive sort of way-it now looks

as if there has been a reversal. It now looks as if it is law, not the
foreign discipline which is in the driver's seat. It looks as if it is law
56
that is the constituting subjectivity in interdisciplinary work.

And yet, it remains true, as suggested a mere three paragraphs
ago that "law and . . ." work often "appears to automatically bestow

upon the foreign discipline, the status of a constituting subjectivity."
And it is true, that law correspondingly appearsto be reduced to some
subordinate object field. And yet it is also true that, in this very

privileging of the foreign field, the foreign field is privileged in a distinctly legal, logocentric manner: the foreign field is privileged as an
instrument, a technique to resolve in an authoritative manner a legally

defined set of problems. There is no Contradiction here-only a nesting process. The foreign field does appear to be accorded the status of
a constituting subjectivity, but the formal configuration of this constituting subjectivity remains defined by the law. The foreign field is

accorded great authority-but it is virtually always the role, the iden. .
tity, the function of a legal authority. " . '
For instance, consider Judge Richard Posner's jurisprudence.
Despite Posner's obvious distaste for the view that law is an autono56 This is the structure of James White's argument against Richard Posner's recent exploration of law and literature. White argues that in a very real sense Richard Posner has not
encountered the works of literature that he reports having read:
One way to put what is troubling is to think of what is missing from [Posner's]
book. As I, at least, read through it I have no sense of the kind of life one associates with the reading of literary texts: no sense of a mind responding and learning,
no sense of puzzle and illumination, no sense of joy or pleasure in the reading
itself, no sense indeed of the presence of another mind with whom the author is
engaged ....And there is something similar in the way his own text assumes that
it will be read: it has the structure of an argument supported by examples, not that
of a mind reaching out to another mind. It all seems a kind of display, a proof of
something.
White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature? (Book Review), 102 Harv. L. Rev. 2014,
2014-15 (1989) (reviewing R. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988)).
57 As John Stick correctly observes:
I do think that some of the current use of philosophy in legal writing resembles an
arms race: an attempt to acquire as quickly as possible complicated engines of
destruction in order to annihilate the other side. The arms race mentality is naive
in thinking that philosophy is so ...conclusive. Philosophical arguments are not
commodities that can be neatly packaged and easily transported into a foreign land
such as law.
Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic? 100 Har. L. Rev. 332, 397 n. 274 (1986).
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mous discipline,58 the uses that Posner makes of microeconomics in
analyzing law is not distinctly different in form and practice from the
uses an old-school lawyer-academic might make of Supreme Court
opinions. More generally, the contemporary uses of the words "marginal cost," "John Rawls," "Ludwig Wittgenstein," "Immanuel
Kant," in interdisciplinary work are often difficult to distinguish-at
the level of form, practice, and rhetoric-from the ways in which the
lawyer-academics of an older more doctrinally-oriented generation
used the words "Chief Justice Warren," "the Court," or even "Mr.
Justice Peckham." Even within critical legal studies, as Duncan Kennedy explains, the words "fundamental contradiction" have come to
occupy the same old rhetorical space of the legal authority. 9 And, of
course, this is precisely what happens with Posner's microeconomics:
No sooner does his brand of economics displace law as an authoritative and autonomous discipline, than it enshrines itself in the same old
And while the words have
authoritative autonomous place.'
changed, the story stays the same: It looks like economics, it sounds
like economics, but in form and practice, it's good old-fashioned unreconstructed academic lawyering.
And, in a sense, this is really good news. It confirms once again
that the disciplinary solipsism of traditional legal thought really does
work. And what could be better than disciplinary solipsism? Disciplinary solipsism is self-confirming. It's self-validating. It is always
already right. 6' No wonder, Posner's work enjoys such a wide reputation among legal academics: he is telling legal academics that he has
seen the world of economics (a good bit of it at any rate) and that
much of it has already been crafted, mapped, organized in their own
image.
Now, of course, not all foreign disciplines make such intellectually obliging colonies as microeconomics. For instance, despite Posner's best efforts to apply the same old legal categories, the same old
legal grammar, to literature and literary criticism,62 it turns out that
these intellectual colonies somehow seem unwilling to conform to the
58

See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 Harv. L.

Rev. 761 (1987).
59 Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 23, at 15-17.
60 See Balkin, The Domestication of Law and Literature (Book Review), 14 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 787, 797-98 (1989); Schlag, Contradiction and Denial (Book Review), 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 1216, 1217-18 (1989) (reviewing M. Kelman, A Critical Guide to Legal Studies (1987))

[hereinafter Contradiction and Denial].
61 Now, I do not want to suggest that disciplinary solipsism is something that one can
escape altogether. At the same time, I also do not want to suggest that the solipsistic tendencies of all disciplines are intellectually or socially equivalent.
62 See R. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988).
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grammar of the rule of law. That, of course, as Posner points out, in a
winningly solipsistic sort of way, is because they are bad colonies-.
virtually useless to the rule of law or to legal thought. They are barely
worth colonizing at all-of virtually no value to the empire.
Regardless of whether we are talking about good intellectual colonies or bad ones, the important point-the one that matters-is that
the empire is always right and always wins. Posner's reports always
have the same rhetorical effect: they always confirm that there is no
foreign discipline that cannot be tamed, neutralized, exploited, or if
necessary, charted right off the maps. 63 Not only does disciplinary
solipsism do work, but, within its own frame of reference, it is invariably successful.
Now far from claiming that Posner's kind of interdisciplinary applications are bizarre, I want to suggest rather that they are precisely
what we ought to expect. Indeed, I want to make perfectly clear that
my point here is not at all directed at Posner-nor at the ideas of any
particular individual. My point, rather, is about the structure of a
particular form of legal thought-a form of legal thought that
manifests itself most visibly and acutely in Posner's interdisciplinary
work.
Indeed, the sort of theoretical work that Posner does typically
consists in applying the foreign discipline to the law. Obviously not
all theoretical work, not even most of it, consists in application. But it
turns out that, for legal scholars of Posner's generation, theoretical
work is typically a question of "applying the theory to the law." This
is no accident: the sort of application that Posner does is precisely the
sort of application that good old-fashioned lawyer-academics of his
generation have learned and internalized so well-and that used to go
by the name of "applying the law to the facts." After years of being
trained so well by their legal process fathers to "apply the law to the
facts," is it really a surprise that when legal thinkers of Posner's generation turn to applying the foreign discipline to the law, it is through
the mediation of the same old sort of (legalistic) application? Is it
really so surprising that when they talk about theory, it is usually on
the implicit model of applying the theory to the law? Hardly.
One of the reasons it is not surprising is that Posner's generation
of lawyer-academics share with their intellectual legal process fathers
63 Koffler, Forged Alliance: Law and Literature (Book Review), 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1374,
1377 (1989)(reviewing R. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988)
("Posner's book represents the industrialized version of law and literature, in which the energies of art are harnessed to the market, literature is defined in crude Darwinistic terms and no
political or labor unrest gums up the "smooth" workings of the law.")(citations omitted).
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(not to mention, the grandfathers) a discursive system that systematically elides and effaces reflective inquiry into the form of their own
thought.64 The result of this deprivileging of inquiry into form is that
when traditional legal thought goes traveling (in the footnotes)
throughout the university, it never seems to encounter much of anything except itself. The interdisciplinary travels of traditional legal
thought are like a bad European vacation: the substance is Europe,
but the form is McDonald's, Holiday Inns, American Express....
The irony, of course, is that the potential challenges and contributions from foreign disciplines are routinely neutralized because as
soon as these foreign disciplines are "applied" to law, they are
subordinated to and transformed into the same old legal form, the
same old legal role. They are immediately, uncritically, and unreflectively pressed into instrumentalist service to address a pre-formed
(usually normative) agenda of legal problems.65
All of these flips-the substantive privileging of the foreign discipline and its simultaneous subordination to legal form-occur under
the rhetorical rubric of "application." And it is in this naive sense of
"application" then, that there can be no question of "applying"
deconstruction to law. To be specific, there can be no question of
"applying" Derridean deconstruction to law in the sense in which the
discursive practice of "Law and

. . ."work

understands "application"

of a foreign discipline to law. Indeed, to "apply" Derridean deconstruction in this naive sense would only be conceivable once deconstruction had been transformed into a theory, a technique, a method,
or a type of interpretation. But to transform deconstruction into any
of these things is to turn deconstruction into precisely what it seeks to
resist and displace. To transform deconstruction into a theory, etc. is
to relocate deconstruction and confine it to the already inscribed
logocentric matrices of traditional legal thought.
64 It may seem strange to charge legal process scholars with a failure to examine the form
of their own thought. This is particularly true given that, for the legal process scholars, procedural and institutional form served as the foundational situs for the legitimacy of law. Peller,
Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 561, 590-91 (1988). I am certainly
not contesting this point. Rather, I am saying that the legal process scholars did not trouble
the form within which their own thought was created and received.
This is the sort of intellectual shortcoming that might be cured by a reading of Hegel or
Heidegger. See G. Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Mind (1967); M. Heidegger, What Is
Called Thinking (1968). Though, of course, there is no guarantee and there are even reasons
to think the therapy will not work. See Missing Pieces, supra note 25, at 1222-27.
65 The (not quite) final irony, of course, is that the most recurrent objection to interdisciplinary work is that it represents an invasion of law by the foreign disciplines. For a recent
articulation of this objection, see Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99
Yale L.J. 453-55 (1989).
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Such a logocentric confinement of deconstruction is an ironic reversal of Derrida's double gesture-a reversal that misunderstands
the project of deconstruction (at least) twice. First, it misunderstands
deconstruction by making deconstruction complicitous in the reinscription of the very hierarchical arrangement of dualisms such as
theory/practice and serious/nonserious that deconstruction seeks to
displace. Second, by locating deconstruction in the space of theory,
technique, method, etc., this logocentric confinement of deconstruction treats deconstruction as if it were just another theory or just another technique or just another method-at one (in an essentialist sort
of way) with the other theories, techniques, and methods that might
be deployed to understand law.6 6 The error here is the homogenization and neutralization of the different subversiveness of deconstruction through its assimilation with approaches that have already been
reduced to the status of mere theories, techniques, methods, etc.
Deconstruction cannot survive this logocentric confinement and
must thus displace the rhetorical boundaries that would institute and
enforce such a confinement. And in fact, deconstruction already has
displaced this confinement-in Derrida's own deconstruction of the
logocentric concepts of method, application, etc.67
If deconstruction is not something that can be applied to law in
the naive sense of "application," then one can begin to consider on
what terms and in what conditions, deconstruction might be practiced
in law. And as soon as one does, another question arises. Derridean
deconstruction of the works of philosophy is a rigorous enterprise addressed to rigorous texts. Contemporary legal thought, by contrast, is
not expressed in thoroughgoing rigorous texts.68 This is actually quite
an embarrassment for deconstruction in law. Just what is there to
deconstruct here? What has been constructed? Where is a contemporary theoretical legal text that will stand up and say something? Indeed, the prominent accounts of contemporary legal thought-those
66 In short, the logocentric confinement of deconstruction to the space of technique or the
space of theory denies the specific and unique challenges posed by deconstruction.
67 Deconstruction allows
for [no] method: no path leads around in a circle toward a first step, [so much for
Hegel] nor proceeds from the simple to the complex, nor leads from a beginning to

an end ....

[So much for classic linear thought] ....

We here note a point/lack

of method: this does not rule out certain marching order.
J. Derrida, Dissemination 271 (1981).
68 As David Kennedy notes, "The key.., is to see each rotation, each repetition and tonal
change within legal scholarhsip as a collapse of the scholarly voice which takes advantage of
the previous strand's hidden awareness of the impossibility of its own project." Kennedy, A
Rotation in Legal Scholarship, in Critical Legal Thought, supra note 32, at 353, 359.
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that can credibly make some claim to account for and guide our legal
practice-are virtually all already in a state of collapse. 69 They are all
tripping over themselves and each other in the rush to defer to the
reader, the judge, the lawyer, the legal academic, or their respective
communities to supply the content that is missing from the theoretical
text. Indeed, virtually all the dominant contemporary legal texts depend for their meaning and significance to an extraordinary degree on
the unmentioned, unanalyzed, taken-for-granted understandings of
the legal community. If one asks today, "How is it that contemporary
law is possible and justified?," the answer given by our foremost legal
theorists comes down to this: "We have a community of legal actors
and legal interpreters whose task it is to make it so." Yes, exactly
right.
Now, to be clear: I'm not endorsing this answer. I'm simply noting that it has become the answer of choice among legal thinkers today. And I'm not the only one who has observed that it is the answer
of choice. Not at all. Consider, for instance, Suzanna Sherry's description of cutting-edge jurisprudence in American constitutional
law:
In light of the failure of the "grand theories" to produce a useful
and noncontroversial theory of constitutional constraints, many
constitutional scholars have recently turned instead to anti-formalist, anti-theoretical approaches. In articles too numerous to
mention individually, these scholars have begun to suggest that deciding constitutional cases requires what might be called judgment
or practical reason, and to describe the exercise of that faculty.
Because the literature is so extensive and impressive, I will describe
it only very briefly ....
Judging---especially in difficult constitutional cases-is not a
mechanical exercise, but a learned and lived craft. The tools of the
trade are a thoughtful life lived in American social and legal culture. A pragmatist finds no formula by which to decide the difficult questions, but instead internalizes legal precedents, cultural

traditions, moral values and social consequences, creatively synthesizing them into the new patterns that best suit the question. at
hand. No single source will adequately address the hardest questions; answers to societal dilemmas must be crafted from the web
rather than constructed from the tower.
Above all, judging is an act of controlled creativity. Like writing at its best, it both draws on and evokes memories of what has
gone before, but by innovation rather than mimicry. It simultaneously acknowledges our debt to the past and denies that the past
69

See Schlag, Legal Nihilism (forthcoming 1991) [hereinafter Legal Nihilism].
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should control the present. The task of the pragmatist decisionmaker is to reconcile a flawed tradition with an imperfect
world so as to improve both and do damage to neither.70
This is a remarkable, and indeed all the more remarkable because entirely accurate, picture of the current state of American legal thought.
One of the striking things about this account is that at every difficult
turn-when it is time to internalize norms and yet remain adept at
creatively synthesizing new solutions; when it is time to control
thought and yet be a creative thinker; when it is time to acknowledge
the past without letting it control the present-in other words, at each
difficult turn, this neopragmatist account refers the reader to some
place outside the text,
to practical reason,
to the good judgment of the pragmatist,
to the lived craft of judging,
to a thoughtful life lived in American social culture.
What is striking about this account is that it collects a series of
deeply problematic antinomies and then suggests that these antinomies should and can be reconciled outside the text in the person of the
pragmatist. Thus, according to this text, a pragmatist "internalizes"
all sorts of precedents, cultural traditions, etc., and, by some process
(that apparently occurs outside this text) this "internalization" leads
to "creatively synthesizing" all sorts of things including precedents,
cultural traditions, moral values, and other incommensurables. If this
seems like a difficult task, remember that the pragmatist is no mere
mortal, but is apparently an adept at "controlled creativity." Again,
the account of what is "controlled creativity" (other than something
we are obviously supposed to like) is left outside the text.71
Now, I think Sherry is entirely correct in her description of the
current renaissance of the pragmatic tradition in American legal
thought. And I think this renaissance is no accident. Legal thinkers
have learned that the text is a bad place to work out contradictions,
aporias, and other intellectual difficulties. Texts create all sorts of
problems. They are too equivocal, they are too iterable; they are too
open, too public. Better, then, to find some place to deal with these
difficulties that is impervious to texts-say, for instance some mystical
place outside the text-say, the good judgment of the pragmatist.
Yes, that's it. So--how is it that we, in law, resolve difficult problems,
70 Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting An Unwritten Constitution, 64 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1001, 1013 (1989).
71 Interestingly, Steve Winter has begun to explore the implications of the recognition that
legal thought is at once imaginative and situated. See Winter, supra note 11.

1660

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1631

reconcile contradictions and overcome aporias, etc.? The answer of
modem American legal thought is clear and unequivocal: "We refer
them to the good judgment of the pragmatist." Yes, quite so.7 2
Now, it would be extremely unfair to characterize current legal
neopragmatism as the only American legal tradition rushing to refer
difficult problems to some extratextual theoretical unmentionable like
good sense or good judgment. 73 On the contrary, legal neopragmatism has much company. Consider one other instance. Consider, as
another emblem of contemporary legal discourse, Dworkin's theory
of law as integrity."4 In order to make Dworkin's text mean something-in order to give it an interesting, relatively determinate aesthetic or political content-the reader has to project or transfer a
terrific amount into the ruling concepts and the ruling architecture of
the theory. The theory itself, while extraordinarily elegant and rhetorically refined, is, when it comes right down to it, nonetheless (virtually) empty.
In fact, the theory could easily have served (and served well) in
the 1988 electoral campaign. Instead of having George Bush wishing
for a kinder, gentler America, he could have taken a jurisprudentially
sounder stance: for instance, he could have said "I want to make
America the best it can be. I want an America whose moral values fit
history-an America that is coherent---one that holds together with
''
integrity for all. 7Of course, just so you know that I am not reaching, this line was
in fact used in the 1988 campaign. It was the Dukakis line." As
between Bush and Dukakis, it is, of course, clear whom Dworkin
would favor. Indeed, this is one of the admirable things about Dworkin's theory: he does take his own politics seriously and his politics
do influence his theoretical framework. But there is something that is
not admirable about Dworkin's theory-and that is precisely that
72 For further criticisms of legal neopragmatism, see Contradiction and Denial, supra note
60, at 1221; Cannibal Moves, supra note 14, at 954-58; Missing Pieces, supra note 25, at 122325. For substantially similar criticisms, see Hutchinson, The Three R's: Reading/Rorty/Radically (Book Review), 103 Harv. L. Rev. 555 (1989) (reviewing R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony
and Solidarity (1989)).
73 Contradiction and Denial, supra note 60, at 1222 (Any theory or mode of thought has
certain gaps, holes, and absences that, by virtue of the internal constitution of the theory or
mode of thought, cannot be articulated in positive terms. Sometimes these gaps, holes, and
absences bear names, and thus appear to have integrity and substance, even though by definition or by theory nothing positive can be said about them. These, then, are theoretical
unmentionables.)

74 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
75 Compare the text with Dworkin, supra note 74, at 225, 410-13.
76 The Presidential Debate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
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while his theory does authorize his politics, in a sense, it also authorizes virtually everybody else's politics. Indeed the deliberate irony of
putting Dworkin in Bush's mouth, is to draw attention to how vacant
Dworkin's theory really is: its content (and form) depend largely on
the identity of the person who wields the theory.
Virtually any sort of judge might feel perfectly comfortable, unconstrained, and unreconstructed working with Dworkin's theory of
adjudication. Indeed, there is nothing in Dworkin's theory that
would call for Duncan Kennedy, Robert Bork, Richard Epstein, or
Richard Posner to alter their jurisprudence in any significant way
whatsoever. To be sure, they would all have to talk a bit more like
Dworkin, and the metatheoretical status of their jurisprudential theories would change, but even so the main story lines (critical thought,
intentionalism, libertarianism, efficiency analysis) could all remain the
same.
There is nothing in Dworkin's theory to rule out any of these
widely varying jurisprudential views-nothing that is, except for
Dworkin himself who would no doubt interpose and object: "No
Duncan, no Robert, no Richard, and not you either Richard-you
guys all blew it again: your theories are simply not the most morally
appealing they can be in light of the institutional history. Try harder,
guys. Be the best you can be." 77
Now, of course, this sort of interpretive intervention is familiar
rhetorical fare in legal thought. Indeed, people will generally be
quite willing to explain the meaning or the significance of their own
metatheories. This is especially true at critical junctures where it begins to look as though the metatheory could easily mean-just anything at all. This sort of interpretive intervention is also especially
useful when there is a significant gap between the metatheory and the
theory. So it is no surprise at all that Dworkin is more than happy to
tell you what "making the law the best it can be" really means.7
What it really means, of course, as a metatheory, is the adoption of
Dworkin's own theories.79 And correspondingly, what his metathe77 This passage borrows liberally from Stanley Fish who has already made the point that
Dworkin's theory is, qua theory, a kind of cheerleading. Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses
of Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1773, 1793 (1987). In Stanley Fish's view, Dworkin's account of
adjudication scores much better in the judicial rhetoric competition. From Stanley Fish's
perspective this is a compliment-but as this compliment is addressed to Dworkin (who is as a
philosopher of law professionally obliged to reject it) the compliment cannibalizes itself. Id. at
1790-94.
78 As Dworkin, says this sort of interpretive elaboration of his "law as integrity" conception is itself a part of the "law as integrity" conception. Dworkin, supra note 74, at 226. As
Dworkin puts it, the "law as integrity" conception is "relentlessly interpretive." Id.
79 Id. at 387-97. (Wherein we learn how Hercules would have decided Brown and Bakke:
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ory does not mean-at least not according to Dworkin-is the jurisprudence of Duncan, Robert, Richard, or Richard.
In a sense, Dworkin's own intervention in the interpretation of
his own metatheoretical enterprise is really quite unobjectionable.8 0
Why shouldn't Dworkin be allowed to offer his own theories as candidates for his own metatheory? No reason at all. At the same time,
however, it is not evident that Dworkin is entitled to special credibility when be declares that his own theories are the winners of the
metatheoretical ("Make the law the best it can be") competition.
One reason one might entertain questions on precisely this point
is that the very problem that plagues Dworkin's metatheory-a noticeable absence of jurisprudential content-seems to plague his more
concrete theories as well. For instance, consider the following passage describing how Hercules would have decided Lochner:
[Hercules] would not have joined the Lochner majority, for example, because he would have rejected the principle of liberty the
Supreme Court cited in the case as plainly inconsistent with American practice and anyway wrong and would have refused to re-examine the New York legislature's judgment on the issues of policy
that then remained."1
Dworkin's supporting footnote is even more revealing:
The opinion in [Lochner v. New York] treats the issue as one of
principle, about whether bakers and their employers have a right to
contract for longer hours if they wish. Hercules would have replied that the particular interpretation of the principle of freedom
of contract this assumes cannot be justified ir any sound interpretation of the Constitution.82
Well, there it is: stone cold devastating. See-it's not so hard to be
Hercules. In fact, when you look at Hercules in action, it turns out to
be pretty easy: It's pretty conclusory.
Of course, there is one important question still to answer: when
you are Hercules, who will you be? It's important not to lose sight of
this question because, if nothing else, it's the one Dworkin wants you
to answer. That's right, his entire theoretical edifice was constructed
so that you could answer the question. Indeed, Dworkin's metatheoretical efforts can be understood as an elaborate and elegant gesture
whose single most important textual effect is to defer interpretation
and meaning to a particular kind of reader-namely, the legal thinker
apparently with virtually no case analysis and lots of self-validating assumptions about the
ethical beliefs of the American people).
80 See supra note 78.
81

Dworkin, supra note 74, at 398 (emphasis added).

82 Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
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Once one understands this point, the reac-

tions of various kinds of legal thinkers to Dworkin's enterprise become intelligible.
Some legal academics very much like Dworkin's text, because his
text authorizes them to project into his text-the text of law, he tells
us-their favorite hopes. For political liberals, Dworkin's theory and
its moral inclination is seen to authorize and favor political liberalism.

Political liberals generally think they have the most appealing normative theories going, and if only they can argue the law on normative
grounds, they will surely win. 84 For political liberals, Dworkin's theory allows law to be wakened from its legal positivist slumber into the
daylight of normativity.

That, of course, is precisely what political conservatives fear.
For political conservatives, Dworkin's metatheory unnecessarily and
undesirably expands the range of legal argument beyond what they
see as the legitimate terrain of legal positivism and its attendant insis-

tence on traditional forms of legal reasoning, legal process considerations, and canonical forms of interpretation. Political conservatives
prefer this rhetorical terrain because, as they see things, it restricts the
grounds of argument to the past-a past that they, of course, see as

coinciding with an essentially conservative politics. For political conservatives, Dworkin's theory thus derails the 'straight course of the
law into the swampland of political liberalism.
As for cls-ers, they view Dworkin's theory as providing
(virtually) no constraint on decisionmaking; instead, it serves as a nice
83 It is not immediately apparent what we are supposed to make of the fact Dworkin personifies his ideal judge as Hercules when in fact Hercules himself was not exactly the most
intellectually gifted kind of guy. But see infra text accompanying note 81.
84 Political liberals generally seem to think it is useful to depict the rhetorical field of law in
normative terms. See Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989);
West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 531 (1988).
I suppose there is some validity to this supposition in the sense that constructing the
rhetorical field in normative terms enables the liberal position to be articulated in the first
place. On the other hand, the normative plane is extraordinarily weak and ephemeral by comparison to the cognitive one. As Heller puts it: "Law is essentially a cognitive and professional, rather than a normative discipline, referring to theory only in the liminal case where the
content of settled practice comes into crisis. In other words, the practice of law primarily
consists of the hermetic reproduction of that which already exists ..
" Heller, Structuralism
and Critique, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 186-87 (1984).
I would add that not only is contemporary normative legal thought characteristicallyineffectual in altering law and legal practice, but that indeed its dominance within the legal academy stems in part from the fact that it is guaranteed to produce virtually no significant change
in the practice of law whatsoever. Normative legal thought is, in its present form, a symptom
of homeostasis. For elaboration, see Normative and Nowhere To Go, supra note 20; Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form (forthcoming in 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.); Winter, supra note
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story line for whoever decides to use it."5 From a critical perspective,
Dworkin's theory provides an elegant and elaborate framework whose
effect is ultimately to defer virtually all important jurisprudential decisions to those select readers already in power (i.e., judges, legal academics) without requiring any critical examination by anyone of the
predispositions, value commitments, and cognitive orientations of
these power holders. Indeed, from a cls perspective, Dworkin's theory is probably the most highly refined, most highly sophisticated
trans-ideological legitimation package to come out of the legal academy in recent memory. As apologetics go, it's truly state of the art. 6
So what does Dworkin's theory mean? In one sense, I will leave
you where he leaves you; it's up to you to do the work. Apparently,
we have reached the point where the theoretical texts of traditional
legal discourse signify something, but only on the condition that their
reader project a tremendous amount into the text. We have apparently reached the point in American legal thought, where the reader
has to do virtually all the work ....
But don't take my word for it. It's not just me who is telling you
this. Not at all. Dworkin's text tells you this; neopragmatism tells
you this.87 Indeed, all these theoretical texts will tell you that most of
the action is elsewhere-not in the theories, but in the reader, in the
legal actor, or in the interpretive practices that constitute the reader
or the legal actor. In fact, not only will these texts tell you so-but
what's more, they will be proud to tell you so. These texts will tell
you right up front-right on the very surface of their texts-thai what
really matters is located in the reader, or in the decision-maker, or in
their customs, or in their practices, or in some analogous linguistic
space located somewhere outside the text. And this thoroughly mystical somewhere-a somewhere that is nowhere in particular, save
outside the text-will bear comforting names like "common sense,"
"good judgment," "good faith," or some such theoretical
unmentionable.88

85 But see, Boyle, Legal Fiction (Book Review), 38 Hastings L. Q. 1013, 1022 (1987) (suggesting that Dworkin's Law's Empire is clearly not as vacuous as his prior book Taking Rights

Seriously).
86 See Boyle, supra note 85; Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire (Book Review), 96 Yale L.J. 637 (1987).
87 Stanley Fish tells you this.
As I've argued, however, when Fish says that theory does not matter, he is saying too
much. Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 Geo. L.J. 37, 5558 (1987) [hereinafter Autonomous Self].
88 Contradiction and Denial, supra note 60, at 1222; Autonomous Self, supra note 87, at
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Now, given such virtually empty texts, what is it that is to be deconstructed? This is more of a problem than it might seem: there is not a
great deal to engage in these theoretical texts, precisely because their
main move is to refer the reader elsewhere to some place outside the
text. If all these texts of contemporary legal thought constantly refers
all that is important to some place outside the text, what will deconstruction turn to?
The answer to this question has already been provided by the
theoretical texts of contemporary legal thought. And the deconstruction has already begun. What must be deconstructed is precisely this
recurrent and repetitive textual reference to the outside. The text of
orthodox legal thought is always already exteriorizing. It is always
already referring to the outside. What it doesn't want to discuss, of
course, is its own interiority, its own organization, its own internal
constitution.
And what is it that the grand texts of contemporary legal
thought construct? Why, it is the very addressee of those legal texts
who has been constructed. It is the self of this authorized addressee:
the legal academic, the law student. And it is a very particular kind
of self that has been constructed-a self that is authorized to give
meaning and normative charge to law and legal thought. This is a self
that is constructed by the text of law to systematically situate itself
outside the text of law. It is a very imperial self that has been constructed--one that is at the very center of law's empire-a self very
much like Dworkin's Hercules. For who is Hercules-if not the privileged individual self of the legal academic who stands outside the text
of the law and makes it the very best it can be?
Hercules may or may not make a lousy judge. There is room for
disagreement. But one thing is clear: as the depiction of the idealized
self-image of the traditional legal academic displaced onto the character of the judge, Hercules is close to perfect. Hercules is the idealized
self-image of the legal academic who by virtue of his intellectual
prowess and his commitment to the rule of law applies his overarching legal knowledge to rewrite the case law in a way that is morally
appealing. In short, Hercules is an empowerment fantasy-an empowerment fantasy for legal academics.
And as empowerment fantasies go, Hercules is really good. Not
only does Hercules authorize the legal academic to act out the Herculean rule, but he demands that judges be more like himself as well. He
demands, in other words, that judges be more like the idealized selfimage of legal academics. In this way, Hercules places the idealized
self of the legal academic-himself-at the center of it all. The rhe-
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torical entailment is that judges (and reality) are but degraded versions of Hercules and Law's Empire, respectively.89
Hercules is at once a reflection of the rhetorically constructed
self of the legal academic and the construction-in-process of that very
self. Admittedly, Hercules is a bit extreme in the degree of his atomism and in the grandeur of his imperial ambitions. But nonetheless,
Law's Empire would not do as well as it does in the legal academy if
Hercules did not graft easily onto the rhetorically constructed self of
the legal thinker. Hercules is simply a more extreme, more idealized,
more transparent version of the autonomous, coherent, integrated, rational, originary self of the legal thinker-the very self that is typically constructed by and reflected in our legal texts.
Indeed, regardless of its substance, the form of the legal text invariably seems to establish the self of the author and reader as autonomous, coherent, integrated, rational, and originary. Now, of course,
as a conscious substantive proposition, the legal thinker does not for
one minute accept this characterization of the self. We know very
well that, as a description of the self (yours, mine, etc.), Hercules is
utterly fantastic. As a conscious substantive proposition, we know
very well that this representation of the self as a unitary, self-directing
ego is not only ludicrous but unbelievable-an insufferable form of
bragging. Indeed, we "know" that knowledges ranging from normal
positivist social sciences to poststructuralism keep informing the self
that is not autonomous, originary, or anything of the sort.90 We know
very well, for instance, that the self is situated in and constructed by
various relations of culture, rhetoric, power.
And yet despite the fact that we know all this-as a conscious
substantive proposition-the form of our legal texts seems to deny the
very point in its construction of the self of the author and the reader.
The very form of our legal texts denies that the construction of the
self-its particular configurations-is an effect of rhetoric, culture,
power. Sometimes, this denial is relatively transparent. For instance,
how is it that the reader of Law's Empire (you, me) manages to get
through the entire work without ever encountering any serious, selfconscious consideration of power--the power of the empire, the
judge, the author?91 The answer is that questions of power cannot
89 This is truly great stuff. Indeed, how many fantasies do you know of that manage within
the fantasy itself to successfully disparage reality for failure to live up to the terms of the
fantasy. Actually, I am exaggerating here. Contrary to the intimations in the text, it turns
out that virtually every successful fantasy-that is, every fantasy that we do not recognize as
fantasy--accomplishes this feat.
90 See Autonomous Self, supra note 87, at 44.
91 1 am not suggesting that Dworkin never mentions power nor that power does not play a
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arise in a serious way. They cannot arise because the answers have
already been assumed-already taken for granted. Indeed, how appropriate that in a work like Law's Empire, that systematically elides
any serious encounter with power, the leading character, Hercules,
should arrive on the legal scene already invested with tremendous
physical force. How convenient. How true ....
How effective. It works! It works, because the form of our legal
thought prepares us to accept the self, our own, as autonomous and
originary-as outside the realm of culture, rhetoric, power. So, as
readers, we accept without question Hercules and his power as an
entirely plausible self-image. What is even more striking is that we
accept this easily despite the transparent oddity and obvious
dissonance--(now that I mention it)-of having a Greek hunk of limited intellectual faculties serve as a role model for judges and legal
academics.
Now, of course, it looks like I have ruined the Herculean fantasy.
But in fact-that is not true. I didn't do it. I didn't do it-because
(among other things) we all already knew that Hercules is a fantasy.
In fact, that seems to be our problem. We can't seem to make up our
minds-much as we would (in our Herculean moments) like to think
we can.
1.
So the self of the legal thinker is really quite divided against itself. It is a paradoxical creation of the legal texts. As a conscious
substantive propositional matter, it recognizes that it is not autonomous, originary, or anything of the sort, yet the form of the legal text
systematically and subconsciously reproduces this self as the constituting originary subject of law.9 2 So on some level, this self knows
that it is not autonomous or originary. Yet ironically, the texts that
constitute this self lead it to act as if it were autonomous, originary,
role in his work. On the contrary, in one sense, it is precisely the concern with the awesome
power of courts that provides much of the motivation for his work. See Dworkin, supra note
74, at 1-3.
What Dworkin does not do, however, is consider seriously the way in which power consti-

tutes, enables, organizes the normative discourse that he is deploying to justify judicial power.
More generally, he leaves power unexamined and unconceptualized.
92 And indeed, at the level of form this is undeniable: When we write to each other in

professional situations, our form is very often that of radically free individual subjects who
have chosen or who are constrained by (pick one) some exceedingly constraining substantive
commitments otherwise called law and legal argument. We acknowledge, for instance, that we
all "think like lawyers"-in the sense that we all make the same type of arguments and use the
same sorts of analyses. Yet at the same time, of course, we like to think we choose to think as
lawyers and that, we are, in a meta sort of way, in complete control of our lawyerly thinking
processes.
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etc. This then is the "relatively autonomous self."93
This self is relatively autonomous in several senses of the term
relative. First, this self is only relatively autonomous as opposed to
say fully autonomous or non-autonomous. At the same time, however, this self is also relatively autonomous in the sense that it takes a
"relative" stance concerning its own autonomy. The relatively autonomous self is relatively so in yet a third sense of relative--one which
can help harmonize any conflict between the first two senses: paradoxically, this self is a creature whose structure is in part constituted by
the legal texts, but who is in part constituted to act and understand
itself to be autonomous.9 4
And the thing that is really interesting is that, being constructed
in this ludicrous and paradoxical manner, what this self does best, of
course, is project its own ludicrous and paradoxical character right
back into the very legal texts that created it. Hence, for instance, as
Mark Kelman has argued, legal doctrine is organized around an
unstable arrangement of breakpoints between choice and coercion, between intentionalist and determinist discourses that cannot be rationally reconciled.9 5 This, of course, is a perfect reflection of the
structure of the relatively autonomous self ... which, in turn, is a
perfect reflection of what Mark Kelman describes as the nonrational
alternation between intentionalist and determinist modes in legal
discourse. "
Now, if you agree that the relatively autonomous self is ludicrous, you are absolutely right: it is ludicrous-a veritable scandal of
consciousness. Unfortunately, it is also an entirely accurate description of the sort of legal self constructed by our legal texts. But the
scandal does not stop here. Still more unfortunate is that recognizing
just how ludicrous this picture of the self really is can only be of limited value in transforming that self. It is of limited value precisely
because this self-the ludicrous one-is a rhetorical construction of
our legal texts. And despite the best "substantive" ideas any of us
93 For elaboration on the structure of the relatively autonomous self, see Autonomous Self,
supra note 87, at 43-49.
94 As Drucilla Cornell puts it:
There is irony here. The hallmark of modernity is its belief in the autonomous
subject. Yet the objectifying tendency inherent in instrumental rationality threatens subjectivity. The irony is intensified when it is recalled that the proclaimed
goal of instrumental rationality hailed by the Enlightenment as reason itself was
the taming of the objective world on behalf of the subject.
Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291, 308
(1985).
95 Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev.
591 (1981).
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may have, for what the self should do or become, not one of these
ideas is likely to be good enough to enable the self to step automatically outside of the text. And the reason is simple: contrary to the
systematic bias of our discourse, "substance" is not in direct communication with and certainly does not control "form".
If anything, the reverse is more likely to be the case. The texts of
contemporary legal thought are remarkably successful in the rhetorical creation of legal thinkers as relatively autonomous selves. 96 In
fact, these texts are so successful that, even when the individual legal
subject encounters a subject-decentering discourse like deconstruction
or postmodernism, this individual legal subject doesn't even recognize
he has been targeted, much less that he has been hit. On the contrary,
the individual legal subject is likely to transform deconstruction (or
any other subject-decentering discourses) into-what else?-something he can use: a technique, a theory, a method-that is, precisely
the sort of rationalist intellectual tool that can be deployed at will by
the relatively autonomous self whenever it wishes. In the alternative,
the individual legal subject will demand that the subject-decentering
discourse answer for itself in the court of rationalist consciousnessas if rationalism had emerged from its struggles with modernism and
postmodernism, unscathed, intellectually whole, and coherent as
7
ever.

9

From the perspective of traditional legal discourse, what is particularly neat about all this is that, in constructing the relatively autonomous self, the traditional legal discourse constructs a "reader"
who systematically misreads, neutralizes, and coopts even so subversive a discourse as deconstruction. In American law, deconstruction
must thus displace and subvert this relatively autonomous self and its
rhetorical supports. This rhetorical self must be displaced because it
is implicated in the maintenance and reproduction of a rhetorical
form of thought that is at once aesthetically boring, intellectually stagnant, and politically conservative.9
The aesthetic boredom and intellectual stagnation that attends
96 These texts of contemporary legal thought do, of course, get some help from the wider
culture.
97 For discussion of this point, see Missing Pieces, supra note 25, at 1243-47.
98 For further elaboration, see Normative and Nowhere To Go, supra note 20; Legal Nihil-

ism, supra note 69; Normativity and the Politics of Form, supra note 84.
Thomas Heller put it this way:
At the level of theory, global theory is to be replaced by a local set of theoretical
practices. Theory must be analyzed as... one system of practices among others,
with dynamics of reproduction and environmental interaction similar to those of
non-symbolic practices. In displacing the hierarchical superiority over other levels
of practice that is claimed by the pretense of theory to a determinate knowledge of
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the production and consumption of contemporary legal thought are
obviously related. In turn, both are related to the rhetorical privileging of the individual self of the legal thinker. It is this privileging of
the individual self and the insulation of this individual self from the

rhetorical, psychological, social, and political text that allows this self
to repeatedly project its own internal structure onto whatever field it
examines-including

deconstruction.

even such seemingly subversive terrain as

9

The naturalization of the self establishes the self as a rhetorical
space where ideology establishes its relations and operations free from
any critical inquiry. The self becomes in effect one of the rhetorical
spaces where ideology does its work-unquestioned. And one of the

ways in which ideology does its work is precisely by reproducing this
autonomous, originary, integrated self as the fundamental natural

human unit-bounded, whole, substantial, self-directive, and beyond
question.
From my perspective, this is already politics-it is a politics of
form. It is the political constitution of human beings as particular
kinds of selves, with particular kinds of social relations to each other.
From my perspective, this politics of form has already accomplished
much of its political work. The realm of conceivable social relations,
self and others, there is at least a symbolic expression of the desire to decenter the
political power that has in our era, been linked to that pretense.
Heller, supra note 84, at 196.
99 Indeed, in this very symposium Jack Balkin writes:
The deconstructor of the self is still picking her targets .... And this choice (fer we
can find no other word to describe it) is still the grinding of a particular ax,
whether its real motivations are conscious or unconscious ....
Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1629
(1990). Balkin is saying that even the deconstructionist of the self makes a choice about what
to deconstruct-a choice "for we can find no other word to describe it." Id. Now, on the first
reading, Balkin's statement seems self-evidently right, that is, until we read the rest of Balkin's
statement and recognize that it cannibalizes itself. It cannibalizes itself in reference to "unconscious motivations."
For indeed, once Balkin brings up unconscious motivations and the idiom of psychoanalysis, the expressions "choice" and "pick her targets" are probably very far down the list of
terms to account for how it is that the deconstructionist deconstructs this rather than that. On
the contrary, far from there being no other word than "choice" to describe "it," a number of
other words come much more readily to mind: transference, counter-transference, projection,
fixation, blockage, adjustment, etc.
Now, one might think that the reason Jack Balkin could find no other word than "choice"
to describe the deconstructionist's behavior is that "choice" describes the "picking" of targets.
And there is some truth to that. But actually, the problem starts far earlier. It starts when
"the deconstructionist" is located as the subject of Balkin's sentence. Right away, that sentene construction is already begging a question-for that sentence structure already has
Balkin (and maybe the reader) assuming that the deconstructionist is the subject-and that
deconstruction must be explained by reference to the action of that particular subject.
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the permissible channels of change, the identity of agents of social
change, the character of the community have already been established
by the politics of form. From this perspective, the ideational content
of discussion about political or moral values-so-called "value choice
talk"-is, as a political matter, virtually epiphenomenal.
In writing that the relatively autonomous self must be displaced
and subverted, I am not suggesting the annihilation of the individual
self (methodologically or otherwise). To many thinkers, of course, it
will seem that I am. Indeed, true to the form of the relatively autonomous self, legal thinkers often believe that an interrogation of the self
(such as I have attempted here) entails the elimination of the self and
endorsement of some kind of determinism. This is then seen as perfectly horrible. But this classic reaction is itself a projection of the
either/or-free will/determinist structure of the relatively autonomous self onto my argument.
And it is precisely this way of thinking, this sort of repetitive
projection of the rhetorical structure of the relatively autonomous self
that must be deconstructed. What is at stake here is a displacement, a
decentering, not an annihilation, of the individual self. The claim is
not that the self does not exist, nor even that the self is always fragmented, nor even that the individual self never exists.
The difficulty with discourse in the legal academy currently is
that the self of the legal thinker is so vastly overinflated in importance-political and intellectual-that it has failed to recognize that it
has been largely replaced as a decisional site by bureaucratic forms of
organization, linguistic structures, mass communication, etc. In other
words, this prototypically academic self has failed to recognize that it
is largely a language game run by bureaucratic, institutional, and linguistic practices.
But why dwell on the negative? Certainly, the relatively autonomous self doesn't want to dwell on the negative. Of course not: the
relatively autonomous self, after all, is nothing if not self-indulgent.
What else could it be? And so, it doesn't want to hear such rude talk.
It wants to hear a more ennobling discourse-a discourse, for instance
that depicts law as the forum of principle, the realm of public value
talk, of dialogue, of civic republicanism, etc. The relatively autonomous self wants to hear jurisprudential stories that will confirm that it
is still in the driver's seat. In short, what the relatively autonomous
self wants to hear is the intellectual equivalent of graduation speeches.
And of course, that is what it gets-over and over and over again.
Indeed, the law reviews are filled with exceedingly normative articles which say very little, prescribe a great many things, and confirm
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(over and over again) that the author is a deeply moral person who is
deeply committed in a morally humanistic sort of way to arguing that
the reader, who is apparently also a very noral person, should become ever more so. In the future, we will all be incredibly moral and
we will all be doing graduation speeches all the time. 1°°
In fact, even deconstruction might become graduation speech
material. And one can see how easily this might happen. If deconstruction does not succeed in displacing the relatively autonomous
self, the latter will reduce deconstruction to a technique, a theory, a
method, very much like all the other techniques, theories, methods,
etc. And of course, given that deconstruction-as-technique will be
morally empty, the relatively autonomous self will quickly jump to
the conclusion that deconstruction requires some sort of moral supplement-some sort of moral justification to guide and constrain its
use.
This, of course, is hardly surprising. On the contrary, it's boring.
Indeed, having transformed deconstruction into a technique bereft of
meaning and value, the rhetorical economy here requires that value be
located and grounded elsewhere, somewhere outside deconstruction
so as to guide and control the uses, the operation, and the deployment
of deconstruction.
For the relatively autonomous self, deconstruction is morallylacking; some sort of moral supplement is thus absolutely necessary to
sustain and defend deconstruction. The relatively autonomous self
qua deconstructionist is thus ill at ease with his deconstruction. He is
a deconstuctionist, but he has morality envy. And so he seeks to
shore up his admittedly inadequate deconstruction with moral supple.
ments. The problem, of course, is that none of the available store of
moral supplements fits easily with deconstruction. On the contrary,
even in its most self-professedly antifoundationalist moments, normative legal thought cannot seem to get rid of the rhetorical habit of
foundationalism. Normative legal thought always wants to stand in
the rhetorical place that rules decisions on its own canonical terms.
Indeed, normative legal thought seems to be one huge exercise in bad
form. But what else can be expected when the addressees are always
already located as privileged autonomous selves outside history, reason, the social text, and any other kind of writing?
All of this, of course, does not help the relatively autonomous
self qua deconstructionist. He is still looking for a moral supplement
for his deconstruction-one that will not create too many problems
100 For elaboration, see Normative and Nowhere To Go, supra note 20.
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* for deconstruction. And so moral support, moral supplements, must
be found in the weakest, least structured, least determinative, least
foundational forms of moral theory-say ... existentialism.
Existentialism is pretty good (not the best) stuff for the relatively
autonomous self.101 It provides a moral foundation (hence rhetorical
and intellectual security for the self), but the moral foundation is
close to empty (so the relatively autonomous self retains virtually full
autonomy to adjudicate its content). Existentialism is close to just
right.
The irony, of course, is that deconstruction neither needs nor
wants such a moral foundation. And the force of this point does not
change merely because the proffered moral foundation (existentialism) and its transcendental signified (the individual self) are close to
empty. Virtual vacancy is not a mitigating factor. Indeed, a transcendental signified does not become any less of a transcendental signified
simply because it can claim to be virtually empty. On the contrary,
any self-respecting transcendental signified is always already nearly
0 2
empty. 1
CONCLUSION

What then are the politics of deconstruction?, To answer, one
would have to know who asks this question and from which discursive practice? In legal thought, the answer to this last question has
already been written--over and over again. Who asks this question?
It is the relatively autonomous self of the legal thinker. 0 3 It is he who
wants to know what the politics of deconstruction are. And of course,
he wants to know in his typically relatively autonomous sort of way.
And he wants to know in his relatively autonomous sort of way for
some very good reasons-or at least reasons that sound good to the
relatively autonomous self. He wants to know so that -he might decide
whether he is in favor or against deconstruction. He wants to know
so that he might decide whether to oppose or support deconstruction.
1l The best stuff for the relatively autonomous self is Stanley Fish. See, Autonomous Self,
supra note 87, at 45.
102 Indeed, being empty (or nearly so) is an integral part of the way transcendental signifieds
do their work. Consider the following transcendental signifieds: "Interpretive Communities,"
see Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325 (1984) (fairly empty with increasing emptiness
over time); "The best"-as in making law "the best it can be," see Dworkin, supra note 74, at
52, 62, 337 (variable emptiness); "Wealth Maximization," see Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law (3d ed. 1986) (utterly empty, but given to sudden and repeated concretization at regular
intervals).
103 By asking the question "Who asks?" and by answering "the relatively autonomous self,"
I mean to imply that the question could very well have issued from elsewhere-and might thus
have warranted a very different answer than the one I have given here.
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But most of all he wants to know what the politics of deconstruction
are so that he can defer reckoning with the politics of deconstruction:
for the politics of deconstruction are to displace the relatively autonomous self and all the rhetorical baggage that supports his rhetorical
well-being.

